A COMMENT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEWLY ENACTED CYBER LAWS

this writing interrogates several provisions of the Cyber Laws that are unconstitutional as they undermine freedoms of expression, privacy etc.
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Teddy Musonda

INTRODUCTION

The Cyber Security Act[1] and the Cyber Crimes Act[2] (herein collectively referred to as the ‘Cyber Laws’) were both assented to on the 8th of April 2025. The cyber laws are to repeal and replace the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act No 2 of 2021. What must be noted though, is that the cyber laws are not yet operational as the commencement order which would operationalise them has not yet been promulgated by the Minister responsible. Leave that as it may, the constitutionality of the Cyber Laws has been called into question. On that basis, this piece of writing will interrogate several provisions of the Cyber Laws that, as this writing will discuss, are unconstitutional as they undermine freedoms of expression, privacy and contravene our national values and principles as enshrined in the Zambian Constitution.   

The Cyber Crimes Act

1.      Section 5: Section 5 (1) states as follows:

A person shall not intentionally and without lawful authority, communicate, disclose or transmit data, information, a programme, an access code or a command relating to critical information or critical information infrastructure to any person not authorised to access such data, information, programme, access code or command.

This provision is poorly drafted and when strictly interpreted contravenes Article 20(1) of the Constitution. Essentially, the Section prohibits the communication of information that relate to critical information or critical information infrastructure. Critical information as defined by Cyber Security Act essentially means computer data that relates to public safety, public health, economic stability, national security, international stability and the sustainability and restoration of critical cyberspace. Therefore, the interpretation of the Section is that the mere communication or expression of information that would relate to public safety, public health, economic stability, national security, international stability and the sustainability and restoration of critical cyberspace without permission of the state is crimialised. The inherent danger of this provision is that it is broadly couched with the risk of fundamentally undermining the freedoms to communicate ideas, to criticise the government, to expose information regarding the above sectors that would be in interest of public in as far as checking and holding government accountable is concerned.

Although freedom of expression is not absolute, any restriction to freedoms must not abridge or deny the exercise of the right but may only regulate its exercise.[3] what this means in the context of Section 5(1) is that any restriction to the freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 20(1) must not prevent or prohibit individuals from communicating or expression information relating to public safety, public healthy etc. but may only provide instances in which the freedom may not be exercised. It is within this understanding that the author opines that Section 5 (1) contravenes Article 20 (1) of the Constitution.

2.      Section 6: Section 6 (1) provided as follows:

A person shall not intentionally and without lawful authority possess unauthorised data relating to critical information or critical information infrastructure.

Therefore, this provision seems to criminalize the possessing or holding of information or expressions that would be linked to computer data that relates to public safety, public health, economic stability, national security, international stability and the sustainability and restoration of critical cyberspace.  This fundamentally undermines and do indeed infringe on the right of freedom of expression as provided under Article 23 of the constitution. In the case of Mulundika and 7 Others v People[4] the Supreme Court indicated that the freedom of expression includes the freedom to receive ideas and information without interference and to communicate ideas and information without interference. And this is also provided by Article 20(1) of the Constitution. Further, Article 20 (3)(a) allows for a restriction of freedom of expression only if it is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health. To some observers, it is the restriction provided under Article 20 (3)(a) that qualifies Section 6 as being constitutional.

However, the author holds a contrary view. It the authors opinion that the restriction under Article 20(3)(a) does not prevent one form holding or receiving information that relates to defence, public safety, public health – as the cyber security seeks to do – but it only restricts one from holding or receiving information that could reasonably be perceived to adversely impact the defence, public safety, public health of the nation.  Put otherwise, Article 20(3)(a) does not prevent or restrict the mere holding of information that relates to public defence, safety, health as doing so would ultimately render the freedom of expression defunct.

Therefore, section 6 is badly broadly drafted consequently contravening the letter and spirit of Article 20 of the Constitution which guarantees the freedom of expression.

3.      Section 21: this section to the author is one of the most appalling provisions of the Cyber Crimes Act. Section 21(1) stipulates:

“ A person who receives an order relating to a criminal investigation under this Act, shall not without lawful excuse, disclose—

(a) that an order has been made;

(b) anything done under the order; or

(c) any data collected or recorded under the order.”

Essentially, the provision criminalises the act of disclosing to any person that one is under investigation for an alleged offence under the Act, without permission from the State.  It is difficult to appreciate the good will behind this provision. Generally, crimes are intended to prohibit conduct that would harm the pubic or another person,[5] it is thus difficulty to appreciate what harm or danger to society would occasion by one simply disclosing to anyone (including one’s spouse, family member, friends) that they are being investigated by the State. Therefore, this provision manifestly contravenes Article 20(1) of the Constitution. The provision prohibits one from exercising their protected freedom of expression as it denies one from disclosing information that affects them. Moreover, the restriction on freedom of expression under Section 21(1) of the Cybercrimes Act does not fall within the permissible limitations outlined in Article 20(3)(d), rendering the restriction unjustified and to that extent unconstitutional.

The above provisions of the Cyber Security Act significantly negatively impact on the freedom of expression contrary to the Constitution. Freedom of expression must not be unwarrantedly curtailed as it is vital for any society. The Supreme Court for Zimbabwe commenting in the case of Re Munhumeso and Others[6] stated as follows regarding the importance of freedom of expression

“Freedom of expression, one of the most precious of all the guaranteed freedoms has four broad special purposes to serve: (i) it helps an individual to obtain self-fulfilment; (ii) it assists in the discovery of truth; (iii) it strengthens the capacity of an individual to participate in decision making; and (iv) it provides a mechanism by which it would be possible to establish a reasonable balance between stability and social change.”

The Cyber Security Act

Some of the objectives of the Cyber Security Act (Herein referred to as ‘the Act’) is to provide for cyber security in the Republic; establish the Zambia Cyber Security Agency and provide for its functions; provide for the regulation of cyber security service providers; provide for the designation, protection and registration of critical information and critical information infrastructure.[7] The objectives of the Act are well acknowledged as it is vital that Zambia’s cyber space is enhanced and made safe. However, there are several provisions – which are highlighted below – that depart from the virtues of democracy thus undermining constitutionalism.

1.      Section 3:  Section 3 (1) of the Act provides for the establishment of the Zambia Cyber Security Agency (ZCSA) under the office of the President. The establishment of the ZCSA under the office of the President inherently undermines the independence of the ZCSA. It would be easy for the ZCSA to run along with the political agenda of the Executive. It is worth noting that the ZCSA’s objective is to prevent cyber-crimes, therefore, it is difficult to accept that the ZSCA – being established under the office of the President – will be independent enough to investigate cyber security crimes involving members of the Executive or close associates to the President. 

Section 3 makes it clear that the ZCSA will operate under the ‘general direction of the President.’ The President who already as overwhelming powers is granted direct power to control the cyber space, the danger of placing the ZCSA under the direct control of the President is that the President may, quite easily, abusive his/her powers to gain political advantage over his/her rivals. According to Valeria Palanza, limiting the powers of the President over State bodies is one way of checking Executive powers.[8] Section 3 (1) of the Act instead clothes the President with so much power over a very critical sector.

Article 8 (d) of the Constitution read together with Article 9 (1) (b) demands that democracy and constitutionalism are among the national values and principles that must be applied in the enactment of laws. It is thus difficult to entertain the idea that Section 3 (1) is consistent with the spirit of democracy, as democracy advocates for the independence of state bodies and organs from interference or control. This risk is equally manifested in Section 5 of the Act.

2.      Section 5: As noted from Section 5, the ZCSA is headed by the Director General who is appointed by the President, and the President is given powers to appoint supporting staff. The very fact that the ZCSA is constituted by the President and chaired by an appointee of the President undermines its operations in respect of their independence and credibility.

3.      Section 19: The Section provides for a Cyber Security Exercise. Section 19(1) mandates the ZCSA to conduct an exercise at least once a year whose purpose is to test the readiness of controllers to a cyber-attack. Section 19(2) grants the ZCSA discretion to conduct this very exercise at intervals they deem fit. The primary concern with these Sections is that they do not delineate the scope or framework within which the exercise is to be conducted.  Without a clearly established limit, or identifiable scope and description of such exercise, it leaves us with little or no room to question the extent or depth of such exercise when it is conducted. Consequently, these provisions have the potential for judicial manipulation in a sense that, due to the lack of a clear benchmark upon which to test the reasonableness or legality of a conducted Cyber Security Exercise, the Courts may avoid intervening on account that the ZCSA would be exercising discretionary powers in pursuance of their administrative function.  

Evidently, the ZCSA has been granted extensively undefined powers to conduct a Cyber Security Exercise, and in the absence of clear guidelines governing their actions, the President-who oversees the ZCSA – could potentially exploit the exercise for personal gain, using it to target political opponents and others for strategic advantage. Furthermore, the absence of clear guidelines governing their actions makes it difficult to use the Act as a reliable measure to determine the legality of their conduct or particular exercise. 

With regards to the Constitutionality of the Section 19. Article 17 of the Constitution provides for the Protection for Privacy of Home and Other Property. Essentially, every person is protected against the invasion of their privacy whether through their property, person or home. The Article provides for circumstances in which the exercise of this right may be restricted, among which are for purposes of safeguarding the public defence, public safety, health, morality inter alia.[9] And when it is reasonable in order to protect another person’s rights.[10] However. Section 19 by granting the ZCSA extensive powers to conduct a cyber exercise whenever it deems fit while not providing clear guidelines on the manner and extent of such exercise, risks the invasion of people’s privacy. People’s privacy may be invaded even when the restrictions or limitation of the right to privacy as provided under Article 17 of the Constitution have not been satisfied. On this account, the broad manner in which Section 19 is couched does not respect the letter and spirit of Article 17 of the Constitution.

CONCLUSION

It must be mentioned that the general essence and objectives of the Cyber Laws are well acknowledged. It is of good sense, as Kaaba states that threats and crimes that would be committed physically are equally prohibited when done online.[11] However, the provisions highlighted in this writing are just a few examples of the many provisions that have been broadly drafted and as Kaaba observes, poorly drafted.[12] Hence, these provisions manifestly contravene provisions of the Constitution, as those discussed in this writing, directly  or in effect potentially undermines the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution.  The end which the cyber laws seek to serve may be good intended; however, the language of the laws must be significantly improved, ensuring that the align to Constitutional provisions.



[1] No 3 of 2025

[2] No 4 of 2025

[3] [1996] ZMSC 26

[4] Ibid

[5] Stanton-Ife, J. What is the Harm Principle For?. Criminal Law, Philosophy 10, 329–353 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-014-9311-8

[6] (1994) 1 L.R.C. 282

[7] Memorandum of the Act

[8] Palanza, V. Checking Presidential Powers: Executive Decrees and the Legislative Process in New Democracies (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019)

[9] Article 17(2)(b)

[10] Article 17 (2)(c)

[11] Kaaba, O. The Cyber Crimes and the Cyber Security Acts: The Good and the Bad. (2025) The Cyber Crimes and the Cyber Security Acts: The Good and the Bad - Amulufeblog

[12] ibid

About the Author:

Teddy Musonda is a final-year law student at the University of Zambia. He is the Managing Editor at Amulufeblog.com. Teddy Musonda writes in his personal capacity



The views and opinions presented in this article or multimedia content are solely those of the author(s) and may not represent the opinions or stance of Amulufeblog.com.

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