By: Joseph Stone Phiri
Introduction
Zambia’s legal and political landscape has long been shaped by the doctrines of Constitutional Supremacy and Parliamentary Supremacy. Constitutional Supremacy holds that the written Constitution is the highest law of the land, while Parliamentary Supremacy suggests the legislature has broad authority to make or amend laws. In constitutional democracies like Zambia, these doctrines must be understood within the framework established by the Constitution of Zambia and its amendment laws, specifically the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016 and the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 13 of 2025, enacted just months before the 2026 general elections. This article examines these doctrines, the procedures for amending the Constitution, and whether the 2025 amendments were justified — especially in view of democratic principles that prioritise judicial independence, the rule of law, and separation of powers.
I. Constitutional Supremacy in Zambia
The 2016 amendments to the Constitution inserted a clear Supremacy of Constitution clause. Article 1 of the Constitution (as amended by Act No. 2 of 2016) provides:
“This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of Zambia and any other written law, customary law, and customary practice that is inconsistent with its provisions is void to the extent of the inconsistency.”¹
This means that the Constitution overrides any ordinary law, subordinate legislation, customary practice, or executive action that conflicts with constitutional provisions. The same provision affirms that:
“An act or omission that contravenes this Constitution is illegal”, and that “This Constitution shall bind all persons in Zambia, State organs and State institutions.”¹
These clauses embed constitutional supremacy in Zambia’s legal order, ensuring that all state organs — including Parliament — must act within the limits set by the Constitution.
II. Parliamentary Supremacy and Constitutional Limits
While Zambia recognises constitutional supremacy, Parliament retains significant authority to amend the Constitution, subject to procedural and substantive constraints.
A. Constitutional Amendment Procedure
The Constitution sets out the amendment procedure under Article 79:
“Subject to the provisions of this Article, Parliament may alter this Constitution … a bill for the alteration of this Constitution … shall not be passed unless— (a) not less than thirty days before the first reading of the bill in the National Assembly the text of the bill is published in the Gazette; and (b) the bill is supported on second and third readings by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members of the Assembly.”²
Article 79 further provides that certain entrenched provisions, such as Part III (the Bill of Rights) and Article 79 itself, can only be amended after a popular referendum.²
This framework establishes that while Parliament is empowered to amend the Constitution, its power is not absolute. Entrenched provisions require both a parliamentary super-majority and direct participation by the people through referendums when fundamental rights are affected.
III. The 2016 Constitutional Amendments
The Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016 was assented to on 5 January 2016 and introduced wide-ranging revisions, including the Supremacy of constitutional clauses and national values.³ The 2016 amendments reinforce constitutional supremacy by requiring that sovereign authority ultimately resides in the people and must be exercised in accordance with constitutional norms.¹
The 2016 amendments also reaffirm that Zambia is a unitary, multi-party democratic state and introduce national values such as democracy, constitutionalism, and good governance, which guide how the Constitution is interpreted and applied.¹
IV. The 2025 Constitution Amendments: Parliamentary Supremacy in Action
In 2025, Parliament passed the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 13 of 2025, commonly referred to as Bill 7 of 2025, which amended several constitutional provisions, including Article 47 — changing the electoral system to a mixed-member proportional representation model and revising aspects of council and parliamentary representation.⁴
The amendment was passed by Parliament and assented to by President Hakainde Hichilema on 18 December 2025 after it had been scrutinised by a select committee and debated on the floor of the National Assembly in accordance with the constitutional amendment process.⁵
The legislative history shows that the Bill was first introduced, declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court for failing to comply with the consultative requirements in Article 79, and later revised following nationwide public consultations by a Technical Committee on Constitutional Amendments before being passed by the required two-thirds majority in Parliament.⁶
V. Was It Right to Amend the Constitution so Close to the 2026 Elections?
This question requires balancing legal legitimacy with democratic legitimacy:
A. Legal Legitimacy
From a strictly legal standpoint, Parliament acted within its constitutional authority. The amendment bill was published in the Gazette 30 days before its first reading, and it secured the required two-thirds majority on second and third readings, satisfying Article 79’s requirements.² Furthermore, the Constitutional Court initially declared the first version unconstitutional because of procedural defects, leading to broader consultations before reintroduction — which aligns with the Constitution’s demand for a people-driven process where consultations and stakeholder engagement are required.⁶
Thus, on procedural grounds, Parliament did have the right to amend the Constitution.
B. Democratic and Principled Considerations
However, legality does not necessarily equate to democratic wisdom. Conducting major constitutional amendments close to the 2026 general elections raises concerns about whether the process was driven by political expediency rather than a genuine effort to advance constitutionalism.
As a law student and author, I believe that constitutional reform — especially on matters as fundamental as electoral systems and governance structures — should prioritise strengthening judicial independence, the rule of law, and separation of powers, rather than being perceived as timed to influence electoral outcomes. A constitution should serve as a framework for democratic stability, protecting rights and institutional balance, rather than be used for short-term political gains.
VI. Conclusion
Zambia’s constitutional framework reflects a careful interplay between constitutional supremacy and Parliamentary authority to amend the Constitution. The 2016 amendments entrenched constitutional supremacy by making the Constitution the highest law, binding all state organs and citizens.¹ The 2025 amendments demonstrate how Parliament can exercise its authority to amend the Constitution, provided that it adheres to the procedural safeguards of Article 79.²
While Parliament acted within its legal authority to amend the Constitution, meaningful reform should centre on consolidating constitutionalism — particularly judicial independence, the rule of law, and genuine public participation — rather than being viewed principally through a political lens near election cycles. This strengthens the legitimacy and resilience of Zambia’s constitutional democracy over time.
REFERENCES
Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016, Part I, Article 1(1)–(3) (Zambia).
Constitute Project, Constitution of Zambia, Article 79(1)–(3) (Zambia).²
National Assembly of Zambia, Constitution Amendment Act 2016 (Act No. 2 of 2016) (5 January 2016).³
Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 13 of 2025, Article 47 (Zambia).⁴
Act No. 13 of 2025 (Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, 2025) (assented 18 December 2025).⁵
Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of 2025 — legislative history including Constitutional Court review and subsequent consultations.
