Introduction
In 2021, Zambians breathed a sigh of relief when
Hakainde Hichilema swept to power, ending the long and controversial rule of
Edgar Chagwa Lungu. The
new government of the United Party for National Development (UPND) rode a wave
of hope on promises of economic revival, anti-corruption drives and democratic
renewal. Four years later, as the sun sets on 2025, critics continue to argue
that this hope feels like a distant memory. The political environment in Zambia
in late 2025 reflects a mix of progress and persistent challenges. With the general
elections set for August 2026, recent events have highlighted key tensions in the country’s
politics. Since the 2021 transition to President Hakainde Hichilema’s United
Party for National Development (UPND) government, the country has pursued
economic stabilization and institutional reforms. However, as the August 13,
2026, general elections approach, debates over constitutional changes, civil
liberties, economic pressures and opposition cohesion have intensified. This
article examines these issues using data from recent reports and developments
as of 6th December, 2025. It aims to provide an informative overview
while critically assessing how these elements shape Zambia’s democratic
trajectory. The article draws on objective analyses from international
observers as well as local stakeholders on the contemporary issues in Zambia’s
political space.
Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Framework
The quest for a modern constitution in Zambia has
dragged on for decades, with over 10 failed attempts since independence in
1964. Critiques have argued that the Constitution of 2016 despite being born
from a flawed process, was meant to be a fresh start but has instead become a
battleground for power grabs. In 2025, the drama peaked with the introduction
of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 better known as Bill 7
which is currently a hot topic in Zambia. This amendment was pitched as a fix
for “lacunae, omissions or oversights” in the current Constitutional order of
Zambia. As earlier alluded to, these efforts to amend Zambia’s Constitution
have been a recurring theme since independence by different regimes ascending
to the helm of power. Many of these amendments have failed due to reasons such
as disputes on the procedure used or the lack of consensus by citizens. This
current push centers on the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of
2025, which was introduced in May to address perceived gaps in electoral
representation. Some of the key proposals include increasing parliamentary
seats from 156 to 211, introducing a mixed-member proportional representation
system with 30 reserved seats for women, youth and persons with disabilities,
and adjusting constituency boundaries to enhance inclusivity.
Critics, including opposition MPs and civil society
groups, have slammed Bill 7 as a blatant power play. They argue that the
constituency changes smell of gerrymandering—a manipulation of maps to favour
the ruling UPND. They are of the opinion that the proposed mixed member
representation system offers just 30 reserved seats out of 256, a token gesture
that will not truly level the political playing field. In June 2025, the
Constitutional Court in Celestine Mukandila
and Munir Zulu v Attorney General ruled that the bill’s initial executive-led process was unconstitutional
for bypassing public consultations. The court mandated an independent review of
the bill. A 25-member Technical Committee, comprising lawyers, academics and
traditional leaders, was formed to gather views after pressure from the civil society, showing responsiveness to calls for broader
input. This step was praised by the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) as it
promoted legitimacy through expert review. The formation of the technical committee
sparked debate by the wider section of society including renowned Constitutional
scholars like O’Brien Kaaba and Cephas Lumina arguing on the legality of the
method used to form this committee. Despite these debates, the technical
committee conducted nationwide consultations from October to November 15,
gathering 11,860 submissions in just 2 months. The committee’s report, was submitted
to the president by vice chairperson of the technical committee, Landilani Banda
on the 1st December, 2025. The report recommended refinements as per
the submissions made by the citizens countrywide but retained the core elements
of the original draft.
On December 4, 2025, the government announced through
their spokesperson Cornelius Mweetwa that they had returned the bill to
Parliament in its original form, with the second reading scheduled for December
15. The Cabinet has also published a draft version incorporating some committee
feedback, emphasizing electoral equity. Proponents argue these changes promote
broader representation, aligning with international standards for gender and
youth inclusion These supporters of the bill argue that this aligns with global
standards of democratic practices. However, critics, including civil society
and legal experts, question the transparency of the process and potential for
gerrymandering through boundary adjustments. They argue that this could
disproportionately benefit the incumbent party as the delimitation report has
not been made public despite wide calls for the same.
The Daily Nation Newspaper on the 6th of
December, 2025 quoted Makebi Zulu, a lawyer and member of the opposition Patriotic
Front who stated that Bill 7 is defunct. He warns that attempts by the UPND government
to revive and reinstate the bill in Parliament is unconstitutional,
procedurally flawed and unlawful, as well as undermines constitutional
safeguards. In the same newspaper, the Law Association of Zambia is quoted on
the topical Bill 7 stating that “government is inviting instability.” LAZ has
stated that by contemptuously ignoring the judgment of the Constitutional Court
that condemned Bill 7 as illegal and unconstitutional and resurrecting the dead
Bill 7 by taking it back to Parliament, the UPND regime is against the will and
wishes of the Zambian people. Legal experts such as John Sangwa notes that “ Bill 7 has
no legal existence,” he has urged the people of Zambia to resist the changes to
the Constitution so as to protect democracy. These debates underscore Zambia’s
ongoing quest for a people-driven constitution, a process that has been stalled
since independence. As Parliament’s committee reviews Bill 7 urgently, the
outcome could either strengthen trust or deepen divisions in the country. It is
known that the bill requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority to pass,
making it possible for the ruling regime to achieve this feat as they have a majority
in Parliament. This phenomenon has raised concerns about the rushed
implementation being pushed by the ruling regime before the 2026 polls. While the reforms address long-standing
imbalances, evidence from similar processes in other African countries suggests
that without robust safeguards, the reforms risk undermining electoral fairness
rather than enhancing it.
Civil Liberties and Political Participation
Civil liberties in Zambia have remained a focal point,
with international assessments highlighting both advancements and setbacks. The
Freedom House 2025 report rates Zambia as “partly free” with a score of 53 out
of 100, down from the previous year due to selective restrictions on activities
of the opposition political parties. Political rights score 22 out of 40, while
civil liberties stand at 31 out of 60. Human Rights Watch notes a rise in
intolerance toward dissent, including arrests of journalists and activists. Notable
incidents include the 13th April, 2024 arrests and detention of
journalists Rodgers Mwiimba and Innocent Phiri for covering an opposition event
and the continuous arrests of Thomas Allan Zgambo on sedition charges for
online posts criticizing government figures.
In May, opposition leader Raphael Nakacinda received
an 18-month sentence for defamation of the president under what critics have
argued is a repealed law. Critics have argued that the law on criminal defamation
of the president that is provided for in section 69 of the Penal Code was repealed
in 2022. This provision has historically been utilized to target government
critics and journalists. Upon taking office in 2021, President Hichilema had said
that “the provision inhibits the growth of democracy and good governance,
impedes human rights and basic freedom.” Police have frequently denied or
withheld permits for opposition rallies under the 1955 Public Order Act, citing
security concerns, which limits political assembly. Some provisions of this law
have been declared unconstitutional as they infringe on the rights and
liberties of citizens as per the Christine Mulundika and 7 Others v The People
judgement. The right of peaceful assembly is a right that is recognised as a
fundamental right worldwide.
The Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Acts, enacted in
April 2025, aim to combat online threats but have drawn criticism for vague
provisions on ‘hate speech’ and ‘false information’ which potentially enables
surveillance and self-censorship. The Global Network Initiative (GNI) in a
statement in July 2025 stated that these Acts were developed and deliberated
upon with minimal transparency and public participation. While they acknowledge
the Zambia’s efforts to strengthen its digital infrastructure and tackle
cybercrime, they argue that the substance of these laws raises serious concerns
to the freedom of expression, access to information and privacy of citizens and
others in the country. United Nations special rapporteur, Irene Khan in a
statement made in January 2025 on her official visit to Zambia, urged the
government to fulfill commitments to protect freedom of expression amid rising
tensions. She stated that the government came to power on a platform for change,
promising to uphold human rights and it must follow through on its commitments
to foster a truly enabling environment for the freedom of expression.
The World Justice Project’s 2025 Rule of Law Index
indicates a decline in civic space constraints, though overall scores reflect
ongoing challenges. This decline is said to be attributed primarily to the expanding
authoritarian trends, particularly in areas that measure constraints on
government power. Key freedoms that are vital for public participation and
oversight assessed under the Open Government and Fundamental Rights factors showed
broad erosion. These trends suggest that while post-2021 reforms expanded some
spaces, implementation gaps could erode public trust in democratic
institutions, particularly as the country heads to elections next year.
Economic Context and Its Political Implications
Economic conditions underpin much of the political
discourse in Zambia. After defaulting on $18 billion in debt in 2020, the restructuring
efforts under the G20 Common Framework have reduced public debt from 133% of
GDP in 2023 to a projected 90.7% by the end of 2025. Reports by the World Bank have
shown that Zambia is recovering from drought, with growth being driven by
mining, agriculture and tourism. These sectors have been earmarked as some of
the priority sectors as regards Investment in Zambia especially Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) inflows. The report forecasts 5.8% real GDP growth for the year
2025, driven by agricultural recovery and the resilience of the mining sector. It
is seen that inflation is expected to ease to 9.2%, with fiscal reforms
narrowing the deficit to 3.4% of GDP. The government through the Minister of
Finance announced a recent credit rating upgrade which has signaled investor
confidence in the economy of Zambia. This in itself is poised to increase the FDI
inflows into the country going forward.
Despite these indicators, households continue to face
strains from energy shortages as hydropower supplies 80% of the households in
Zambia. These energy problems have been increased by the 2024 drought that hit
the country. Health problems persist as it has been reported that a cholera
outbreak reported 23,378 cases and over 500 deaths by August 2024. This
outbreak was exacerbated by limited access to health care and clean water for
6.4 million people in Zambia. The Sustainable Development Goal number 6 aims at
ensuring clean water for all by 2030 and Zambia hopes to achieve this goal so
as to prevent such health problems in the near future. The 2025 budget
allocated ZMK 73 billion (about USD 2.6 million) for social protection, a step
forward, but critics have argued that there is insufficient investment in
sanitation and job creation for the citizens. Corruption perceptions have continued
to persist, with procurement irregularities of essentials such as medicines in
hospitals prompting U.S. aid reviews.
Analyses from the Economist Intelligence Unit
highlight that while debt relief provides breathing room. It has been observed
that the end of IMF support and US aid in late 2025 could widen deficits from
2026 onwards. Surveys conducted by Afrobarometer reveal that this economic
backdrop influences politics as public satisfaction with democracy has declined,
seeing that growth benefits unevenly distributed. Strengthening governance
links between economic policy and political stability remains essential to
mitigate risks of civil unrest in any country. This civil unrest was seen in
Zambia after 1987 as the economy of the country was failing at the time.
Dynamics Within the Opposition
The multiparty system in Zambia includes over 20
registered political parties, with the Patriotic Front (PF) as the main
opposition, holding a minority of parliamentary seats alongside smaller groups
like the National Congress Party. In response to Bill 7, about 12 opposition
parties formed a consortium in early December 2025 and submitted a letter to
the presidency urging a halt to the process and calling for clause-by-clause
revisions. Five parties further established the ‘We’re One Zambia Alliance’ on
December 5 to coordinate opposition to the bill.
The Oasis Forum, a civil society platform, met with
opposition leaders on December 4, 2025 resolving to lobby parliamentarians
against the bill and address internal divisions. State House has challenged the
consortium to provide specific objections to the bill, framing vague critiques
as political pomposity. While these alliances have signaled renewed
unity—echoing the 2021 coalition that ousted the previous government—challenges
in the opposition have persisted. The Patriotic Front has continued to face
internal legal disputes that could bar it from the ballot in the 2026 elections.
Freedom House observes that restrictions on opposition mobilization hinder
equitable competition. The opposition have claimed that the government has
enacted laws that are restrictive in nature and narrow the political space.
They claim that laws on online speech remain in force thereby preventing them
from offering critic to governance for fear of arrest.
Preparations for the 2026 General Elections
It is seen that the Electoral Commission of Zambia
(ECZ) has advanced key milestones. Mass voter registration, targeting new and
existing voters, ran from October to November, 2025, with no further extension
planned due to the tight timeline of the commission to prepare for elections.
This phase aimed to update the roll amid concerns over outdated data from prior
cycles. The reintroduction of Bill 7 intersects with these efforts, potentially
altering seat allocations and voting mechanisms mid-preparations. President
Hichilema has reiterated commitments to free and fair polls and has emphasized
the strengthening of key institutions in governance. It is seen that a court
injunction and the legal woes in the Patriotic Front could limit the participation
of the opposition in the elections as the PF which is considered the biggest opposition
could possibly not contest the election if they do not put their affairs in
order. With nine months remaining, there is need for timely reforms and
inclusive dialogue to prevent disenfranchisement. This has been noted by a
plethora of constitutional scholars
within Zambia and those within the African continent on the happening in this
country prior to the 2026 general elections.
Conclusion
The path to the 2026 elections reveals systemic weaknesses
that undermine democratic progress in Zambia. While debt restructuring offers
short-term relief to the problems faced by the country, it actually masks
deeper failures. The rushed constitutional amendments risk entrenching
executive dominance as evidenced by the inadequate public input and potential
aspect of gerrymandering. The problem of executive dominance is seen to be a
continued challenge in Africa since colonial times. Restrictions on speech and
assembly, as seen in journalist arrests and rally denials, erode civil
liberties and fosters a climate of fear that stifles opposition and public
discourse. The economic gains experienced over the last few years remain
uneven, with droughts and corruption exacerbating inequality. This in itself
can potentially fuel the discontent of voters and lead to instability.
Analytically, these issues stem from institutional inactivity and power
imbalances, where reforms prioritize incumbency over inclusivity. Without
genuine accountability—through independent oversight and broad stakeholder
engagement—Zambia risks regressing to authoritarian patterns. This may jeopardize
fair polls and the long-term stability the country has enjoyed for years. The
coming months demand rigorous scrutiny to move toward equitable governance.
